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EMOTIONAL	JUSTIFICATION	Santiago	Echeverri	University	of	Geneva		 Theories	 of	 emotional	 justification	 investigate	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	emotions	are	epistemically	justified	or	unjustified.	I	make	three	contributions	to	 this	 research	program.	 First,	 I	 show	 that	we	 can	 generalize	 some	 familiar	epistemological	concepts	and	distinctions	to	emotional	experiences.	Second,	I	use	these	concepts	and	distinctions	to	display	the	limits	of	the	‘simple	view’	of	emotional	 justification.	On	 this	 approach,	 the	 justification	 of	 emotions	 stems	only	from	the	contents	of	the	mental	states	they	are	based	on,	also	known	as	their	 cognitive	 bases.	 The	 simple	 view	 faces	 the	 ‘gap	 problem’:	 If	 cognitive	bases	and	emotions	(re)present	their	objects	and	properties	in	different	ways,	then	cognitive	bases	are	not	sufficient	to	justify	emotions.	Third,	I	offer	a	novel	solution	to	the	gap	problem	based	on	emotional	dispositions.	This	solution	(1)	draws	 a	 line	 between	 the	 justification	 of	 basic	 and	 non-basic	 emotions,	 (2)	preserves	 a	 broadly	 cognitivist	 view	 of	 emotions,	 (3)	 avoids	 a	 form	of	 value	skepticism	 that	 threatens	 inferentialist	 views	 of	 emotional	 justification,	 and	(4)	 sheds	 new	 light	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 our	 epistemic	 access	 to	 evaluative	properties.		
Keywords:	 Epistemology	 of	 emotions;	 epistemology	 of	 value;	 epistemic	justification;	evaluative	experience					 If	Pat’s	fear	that	terrorists	will	attack	New	York	City	is	based	on	CIA	intelligence	reports,	her	fear	is	justified.	If	Peter	is	jealous	of	his	wife	on	the	basis	of	a	mere	hunch,	his	jealousy	is	unjustified.	If	Youna	has	heard	from	a	reliable	witness	that	her	father	is	in	better	health,	she	is	justified	in	being	elated	(e.g.,	Deonna	and	Teroni	2012;	Goldie	2004;	Greenspan	1988;	Huemer	2001;	Mulligan	1998;	Pelser	2014;	Salmela	2006).	Emotions	can	be	epistemically	justified	or	unjustified.	A	theory	of	emotional	justification	seeks	to	spell	out	the	conditions	under	which	emotions	are	epistemically	justified	or	unjustified.		 Most	recent	work	on	the	epistemology	of	emotions	has	rather	focused	on	their	contribution	to	the	justification	of	evaluative	judgments	(e.g.,	Brady	2013;	
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Brogaard	and	Chudnoff	2016;	Brun	et	al.	2008;	Döring	2003).	This	is	unfortunate,	however,	because	emotional	justification	raises	other	issues	of	broader	significance	to	epistemology.	As	an	illustration,	suppose	that	emotions	can	be	immediately	justified	by	mental	states	devoid	of	evaluative	content.	If	this	view	is	correct,	we	should	revise	the	common	idea	that	immediate	justification	requires	that	the	representational	content	of	the	justifier	mental	state	be	identical	to	the	content	of	the	justified	mental	state.	This	paper	will	cast	doubt	on	this	assumption.1		I	shall	make	three	contributions	to	the	theory	of	emotional	justification.		
1.	There	is	some	lack	of	clarity	on	what	emotion	theorists	mean	by	epistemic	justification.	I	will	argue	that	we	can	fruitfully	extend	some	familiar	epistemological	notions	to	the	emotions:	the	concept	of	justification	as	epistemic	permissibility,	the	contrast	between	propositional	and	doxastic	justification,	and	the	distinction	between	immediate	and	mediate	justification.	
2.	The	‘simple	view’	of	emotional	justification	holds	that	the	justification	of	emotions	supervenes	on	the	content	of	the	mental	states	they	are	based	on,	also	known	as	their	‘cognitive	bases’	(e.g.,	Deonna	and	Teroni	2012;	Goldie	2004;	Mulligan	1998).	I	shall	use	the	epistemological	distinctions	introduced	above	to	display	some	limitations	of	the	simple	view	and	formulate	the	‘gap	problem’.	The	gap	problem	is	roughly	this:	If	there	is	a	difference	in	the	ways	cognitive	bases	and	emotions	(re)present	objects	and	properties,	then	cognitive	bases	are	not	sufficient	to	justify	emotional	responses.2																																																									1	This	‘sameness	of	content	assumption’	is	pervasive	in	two	recent	debates:	the	debate	between	‘liberal’	and	‘austere’	theories	of	perceptual	experience	and	the	debate	on	phenomenal	conservatism.	See	the	essays	in	Hawley	and	Macpherson	(2011)	and	Tucker	(2013).	Millar	(2000)	and	Silins	(2013)	have	criticized	this	assumption.						2	I	will	presuppose	a	representational	theory	of	cognitive	bases.	This	is	controversial,	though.	As	we	shall	see,	emotions	can	be	based	on	perceptual	experiences,	which	some	philosophers	analyze	as	devoid	of	representational	content	(e.g.,	Brewer	2011;	Campbell	2002).	Still,	my	arguments	can	be	easily	generalized	to	non-representational	conceptions	of	cognitive	bases.	
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3.	I	will	propose	a	solution	to	the	gap	problem	in	terms	of	emotional	dispositions	(also	called	‘sentiments’).	I	will	defend	this	view	in	two	steps.	First,	emotional	dispositions	enable	us	to	make	room	for	immediate	emotional	justification	while	sticking	to	a	broadly	cognitivist	view	of	emotions.	Second,	the	resulting	view	sheds	new	light	on	the	structure	of	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	The	paper	has	six	sections.	I	start	with	some	remarks	on	the	role	of	emotions	in	our	mental	economy	(Section	1)	and	then	clarify	the	concept	of	epistemic	justification	(Section	2).	In	Section	3,	I	introduce	the	‘simple	view’	of	emotional	justification	and	formulate	the	gap	problem.	Subsequently,	I	examine	some	possible	solutions	to	the	gap	problem	and	find	them	wanting	(Section	4).	In	Section	5,	I	show	how	emotional	dispositions	enable	us	to	solve	the	gap	problem	and	shed	new	light	on	the	structure	of	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	I	conclude	with	objections	and	replies	(Section	6).		
1. Emotions	in	Our	Mental	Life		 It	is	difficult	to	provide	uncontroversial	criteria	to	determine	whether	a	mental	episode	is	an	emotion.	I	shall	circumvent	this	problem	by	relying	on	paradigmatic	examples	of	emotions.	These	include	admiration,	amusement,	anger,	disgust,	embarrassment,	envy,	fear,	jealousy,	joy,	pride,	and	shame.	The	discussion	will	focus	on	conscious	tokens	of	these	emotions.		There	are	different	theories	of	emotions.	I	will	presuppose	a	broadly	cognitivist	conception.	This	influential	view	conceives	of	emotions	as	intentional	psychological	episodes	that	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their	intentional	objects.	This	conception	is	the	conjunction	of	two	claims:	
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Intentionality:	Emotions	are	about	objects,	situations,	events	or	states	of	affairs.	For	simplicity’s	sake,	we	can	refer	to	these	entities	as	the	‘intentional	objects’	of	emotions.3		
	 To	illustrate,	if	Peter	is	angry	with	Pat,	the	intentional	object	of	Peter’s	anger	is	Pat.	If	a	rat	is	afraid	of	the	imminent	electroshock,	the	intentional	object	of	the	rat’s	fear	is	the	electroshock.			
Epistemic	Access:	Emotions	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their	intentional	objects.	Following	a	long	tradition,	we	may	term	these	evaluative	properties	‘formal	objects’	(e.g.,	De	Sousa	1987;	Kenny	1963;	Teroni	2007).4			As	an	illustration,	the	formal	object	of	anger	is	the	offensive,	the	formal	object	of	amusement	is	the	funny,	the	formal	object	of	fear	is	the	dangerous,	the	formal	object	of	grief	is	loss,	the	formal	object	of	pride	is	achievement	by	oneself	or	someone	in	a	suitable	relation	to	oneself,	and	so	on.5	A	consequence	of	the	intentionality	and	epistemic	access	claims	is	that	emotions	can	be	assessed	as	correct	or	incorrect.	An	emotion	E	is	correct	if	an	only	if	its	intentional	object,	o,	exemplifies	the	formal	object	that	E	(re)presents	o	as	having.	It	is	incorrect	otherwise.																																																									3	My	use	of	‘intentional	object’	is	intended	to	be	ontologically	neutral.	Thus,	it	does	not	require	any	commitment	to	non-existent	objects.	4	Some	theorists	refer	to	formal	objects	as	‘core	relational	themes’	(Prinz	2004)	or	‘emotion-proper	properties’	(Goldie	2004).		5	This	list	of	formal	objects	is	not	entirely	uncontroversial.	For	instance,	one	might	hold	that	the	formal	object	of	fear	is	not	the	dangerous	but	the	fearsome	(e.g.,	De	Sousa	1987;	Salmela	2006).	I	will	take	no	sides	in	this	dispute	because	my	arguments	do	not	require	a	specific	account	of	formal	objects.		
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There	are	different	ways	of	developing	the	cognitivist	view.	One	may	hold	that	emotions	are	mental	episodes	analogous	to	judgments	(e.g.,	Nussbaum	2001;	Solomon	1988).	Alternatively,	one	may	compare	emotions	to	perceptual	experiences	that	represent	objects	under	evaluative	modes	of	presentation	(e.g.,	Brogaard	and	Chudnoff	2016;	De	Sousa	2004;	Goldie	2000,	2004;	Döring	2003,	2007;	McDowell	1985;	Roberts	2003;	Tappolet	2011;	Zagzebski	2003).6	More	recently,	Deonna	and	Teroni	(2012,	2014,	2015)	have	defended	the	claim	that	emotions	are	sui	generis	mental	attitudes	that	have	correctness	conditions	but	do	not	explicitly	represent	their	formal	objects.	Since	my	arguments	apply	to	any	of	these	views,	I	will	not	commit	myself	to	any	specific	cognitivist	theory.7		Most	cognitivists	recognize	that	emotions	can	stand	in	two	different	dependency	relations	with	other	mental	states	or	episodes.		First,	emotions	inherit	their	intentional	objects	from	other	mental	states	or	episodes,	also	known	as	‘cognitive	bases’.	If	Peter	is	afraid	at	the	sight	of	the	dog,	his	fear	of	the	dog	inherits	its	intentional	object	from	his	visual	experience	of	the	dog.	Emotions	can	also	inherit	their	intentional	objects	from	thoughts	or	beliefs.	Thus,	Mary	can	be	excited	at	the	thought	of	running	for	office	(e.g.,	Brogaard	and	Chudnoff	2016;	Deonna	and	Teroni	2012,	2014;	Mulligan	1998;	Oliver-Skuse	2016;	Wedgwood	2001).	In	sum,	emotions	require	cognitive	bases.	Cognitive	bases	are	the	subject-matter	givers	of	emotions.																																																									6	Johnston’s	(2001)	view	is	often	listed	as	a	perceptual	theory	(e.g.,	Brady	2010,	2013).	Nevertheless,	Johnston	(2001:	182	n	1)	makes	it	clear	that	he	is	interested	in	a	primitive	form	of	affective	relation	to	the	world	that	is	prior	to	the	emotions.	Prinz	(2004)	is	also	classified	as	a	perceptual	theorist	(e.g.,	Brogaard	and	Chudnoff	2016).	In	my	view,	his	account	is	best	understood	as	an	elaboration	of	James/Lange’s	feeling	theory.	The	emotion	is	a	feeling	of	bodily	changes	that	have	the	function	of	carrying	information	of	the	instantiation	of	a	core	relational	theme.	I	shall	not	discuss	any	of	these	theories	here.	But	see	footnote	29	for	a	brief	comparison	of	my	view	with	Prinz’s.	7	Emotion	theorists	often	use	‘cognitivism’	to	refer	to	judgment	accounts	of	emotions.	My	label	is	closer	to	the	familiar	view	in	meta-ethics	according	to	which	evaluative	statements	express	truth-apt	propositions.		
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Second,	emotions	are	psychological	episodes	for	which	we	can	have	or	lack	reasons	(e.g.,	Brady	2013;	Deonna	and	Teroni	2012;	Goldie	2004;	Greenspan	1988;	Mulligan	1998;	Salmela	2006).	Indeed,	it	is	often	meaningful	to	ask	‘why’-questions	in	relation	to	the	emotions.	The	answers	to	those	questions	do	not	always	convey	merely	causal	explanations	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012;	Goldie	2004;	Mulligan	1998).	If	asked:	‘Why	are	you	afraid?’,	a	subject	could	naturally	respond:	‘Because	that	dog	has	big	teeth	and	is	moving	erratically’.	This	answer	conveys	an	epistemic	reason	for	fear.	A	natural	assumption	is	that	subjects	apprehend	the	epistemic	reasons	for	their	emotions	via	the	cognitive	bases	of	those	emotions.	If	I	am	afraid	at	the	sight	of	the	dog,	my	visual	experience	of	the	dog	can	deliver	the	epistemic	reason	for	fear:	I	visually	represent	the	dog	as	having	big	teeth	and	moving	erratically.	It	is	therefore	plausible	to	hold	that	cognitive	bases	play	two	roles	at	once:	they	are	both	subject-matter	givers	and	reason	givers.	Some	philosophers	have	been	attracted	by	a	more	radical	claim.	On	their	view,	the	epistemic	justification	of	emotions	supervenes	on	the	contents	of	their	cognitive	bases	alone	(e.g.,	Deonna	and	Teroni	2012;	Goldie	2004;	Mulligan	1998).	Let	us	term	this	the	‘simple	view’	of	emotional	justification.	I	shall	suggest	that	emotional	justification	has	a	more	complex	justificatory	structure.	Before	I	defend	this	claim,	we	need	to	get	a	better	understanding	of	the	concept	of	epistemic	justification.		
2. Correctness	and	Justification		 Suppose	that	Peter	has	made	a	sexist	joke	in	Julia’s	presence.	Unfortunately,	you	could	not	help	laughing	at	the	joke.	Was	your	amusement	appropriate?	The	
Forthcoming	in	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	
	 7	
answer	to	this	question	will	depend	on	what	is	meant	by	‘appropriate’.	You	might	think	that	it	was	morally	bad	to	be	amused	by	the	joke	because	it	is	plainly	wrong	to	laugh	at	sexist	jokes.	Additionally,	you	might	think	that	it	was	prudentially	bad	to	be	amused	by	the	joke	because	Julia	is	your	boss	and	she	might	retaliate.	All	these	considerations	notwithstanding,	you	might	still	think	that	the	joke	was	really	funny.	Barring	extreme	forms	of	subjectivism	about	values,	we	could	distinguish	two	different	kinds	of	assessment.	It	is	one	thing	to	ask	whether	feeling	an	emotion	is	morally	or	prudentially	appropriate;	it	is	quite	another	thing	to	ask	whether	the	emotion	itself	fits	its	intentional	object	(e.g.,	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	2000;	McDowell	1987;	Salmela	2006;	Tappolet	2011;	Wedgwood	2001).	In	what	follows,	when	I	speak	of	correctness,	I	will	have	in	mind	the	question	whether	the	emotion	fits	its	intentional	object.	Most	discussions	of	emotional	justification	have	focused	on	their	correctness,	which	is	roughly	analogous	to	truth	or	accuracy.	There	is	however	another	assessment	dimension	that	deserves	to	be	further	scrutinized:	epistemic	justification.	This	dimension	becomes	apparent	when	we	take	seriously	the	idea	that	emotions	are	based	on	other	mental	states	or	episodes	(Section	1).	On	this	view,	an	emotion	can	be	correct	but	based	on	bad	reasons	or	incorrect	but	based	on	good	reasons.	In	this	respect,	emotions	bear	some	similarities	to	beliefs.	This	parallelism	suggests	that	the	theory	of	emotional	justification	can	benefit	from	general	epistemology.	In	what	follows,	I	show	how	we	can	generalize	some	familiar	epistemological	concepts	and	distinctions	to	the	emotions.					
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2.1.		 Justification	as	Epistemic	Permissibility		 There	is	no	single	use	of	the	word	‘justification’	in	general	epistemology.	Moreover,	there	is	a	lively	debate	between	internalist	and	externalist	accounts	of	epistemic	justification.	Thus,	it	is	difficult	to	talk	about	emotional	justification	without	taking	on	controversial	commitments.	I	do	not	have	an	antidote	for	this	problem.	Nevertheless,	we	can	make	headway	if	we	provide	an	approximate	paraphrase	of	the	technical	adjective	‘justified’.	The	dominant	view	holds	that	a	belief	B	is	justified	for	an	agent,	S,	if	and	only	if	forming	B	is	permitted	from	an	epistemic	point	of	view	(e.g.,	Goldman	1986:	59;	Littlejohn	2012:	8;	Pollock	and	Cruz	1999:	123;	Silva	2017;	Wedgwood	2012:	274).	We	can	drop	the	qualification	‘from	an	epistemic	point	of	view’	for	ease	of	exposition.	Thus,	we	have	a	characterization	of	epistemic	justification	as	permissibility:			
	 Epistemic	Justification	as	Permissibility	An	agent,	S,	is	justified	to	believe	that	p	if	and	only	if	S	is	permitted	to	believe	that	p	(=	S	is	not	required	not	to	believe	that	p).	An	agent,	S,	is	justified	to	have	an	emotion	E	if	and	only	if	S	is	permitted	to	have	E	(=	S	is	not	required	not	to	have	E).		 This	characterization	accommodates	the	intuition	that	‘justified’	denotes	a	property	other	than	correctness,	truth	or	accuracy.	Consider	the	internalist	intuition	that	one	is	permitted	to	take	the	content	of	one’s	perceptual	experiences	at	face	value	if	one	is	not	aware	of	any	defeater.	Thus,	one	can	be	epistemically	justified	in	believing	that	p	even	though	one’s	experience	as	of	p	is	illusory	or	hallucinatory	(e.g.,	Huemer	2001;	Pollock	and	Cruz	1999;	Pryor	2000,	2005).	
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Crucially,	we	can	defend	the	same	conclusion	without	presupposing	an	internalist	picture.	Suppose	that	you	think	that	only	true	propositions	can	be	reasons.	Still,	having	a	veridical	experience	as	of	p	may	be	insufficient	for	an	agent	to	be	justified	in	believing	p.	Imagine	that	our	agent	has	a	veridical	visual	experience	as	of	p	but	also	thinks	that	the	illumination	conditions	are	abnormal.	In	this	case,	our	agent	ought	to	check	before	she	forms	the	corresponding	belief.	Before	she	performs	the	relevant	check,	she	is	not	permitted	to	believe	that	p.	Let	us	generalize	these	remarks	to	the	emotions.	Suppose	that	Youna	has	heard	from	a	reliable	witness	that	her	father	is	in	better	health.	In	this	case,	Youna	is	permitted	to	be	elated.	Crucially,	some	might	want	to	hold	that	Youna	is	still	justified	in	being	elated	even	if	the	witness	happens	to	be	wrong.	After	all,	one	might	reasonably	hold	that	Youna	is	permitted	to	trust	testimony	in	the	absence	of	defeaters.	Suppose	now	that	Carlos	is	afraid	of	a	small	spider	in	the	bathroom.	Yet,	his	therapist	has	told	him	that	most	spiders	in	New	York	City	are	inoffensive.	Remembering	this	piece	of	advice,	Carlos	tells	himself:	‘I	should	not	be	afraid	of	that	spider’.	Yet,	the	mantra	does	not	work	and	he	keeps	shaking.	Unbeknownst	to	Carlos,	however,	the	spider	is	venomous.	In	this	case,	Carlos’	fear	of	the	small	spider	is	correct	but	unjustified.										Recall	that	a	theory	of	emotional	justification	should	spell	out	the	conditions	under	which	an	emotion	is	justified.	Our	characterization	provides	a	useful	tool	to	evaluate	accounts	of	emotional	justification.	For	any	candidate	condition,	C,	we	can	ask:	Is	C	necessary	for	an	agent	to	be	permitted	to	have	an	emotion	E?	Is	C	sufficient	for	an	agent	to	be	permitted	to	have	an	emotion	E?	These	questions	will	prove	useful	when	we	examine	the	simple	view	of	emotional	justification	(Section	3).		
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2.2.		 Propositional	vs.	Attitudinal	Justification		 The	analogy	between	the	epistemic	roles	of	beliefs	and	emotions	suggests	that	emotion	theorists	should	exploit	the	distinction	between	propositional	and	doxastic	justification.	In	the	case	of	belief,	one	can	ask	whether	the	propositional	
content	of	a	potential	belief	is	justified	for	an	agent	(propositional	justification)	or	whether	an	agent’s	belief	is	well	founded	(doxastic	justification).	Propositional	justification	concerns	what	one’s	evidence	or	reasons	support;	one’s	belief	is	doxastically	justified	if	it	is	based	on	that	evidence	or	reasons	in	the	right	way.	This	distinction	is	important	because	a	proposition	p	can	be	justified	for	an	agent,	S,	even	though	S	formed	no	belief	that	p.	Additionally,	p	can	be	justified	for	an	agent,	
S,	even	though	S	formed	the	corresponding	belief	via	a	deviant	causal	chain	or	on	bad	reasons	(e.g.,	Firth	1978;	Pollock	and	Cruz	1999;	Turri	2010).8	Suppose	that	emotions	represent	their	intentional	objects	as	having	some	evaluative	properties.	In	this	framework,	a	theory	of	propositional	justification	should	elucidate	the	conditions	under	which	a	potential	emotional	response	with	such	and	such	content	would	be	justified.	Crucially,	this	account	will	be	neutral	on	whether	the	subject	responds	emotionally	to	the	intentional	object.	Suppose	that	Mary	has	offended	Peter.	However,	Peter	has	just	been	notified	that	his	lottery	ticket	is	the	winner.	Being	overwhelmed	with	joy,	Peter	cannot	be	angry	with	Mary.	Still,	anger	at	Mary	is	propositionally	justified	for	Peter.	Let	us	introduce	the	phrase	‘attitudinal	justification’	as	a	generic	term	covering	doxastic	justification	and	its	counterpart	for	mental	states	or	episodes																																																									8	It	is	an	open	question	whether	propositional	justification	is	more	fundamental	than	doxastic	justification,	or	vice	versa.	I	am	inclined	to	favor	the	claim	that	doxastic	justification	is	the	more	fundamental	concept.	I	cannot	defend	this	claim	here.	Nevertheless,	I	will	exploit	a	parallel	view	for	emotional	justification	in	my	solution	to	the	‘gap	problem’.	See	Section	5	and	footnote	26.		
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other	than	belief.	A	theory	of	doxastic	justification	seeks	to	elucidate	the	conditions	that	the	fixation	of	belief	should	satisfy	for	the	resulting	belief	to	be	well	founded.	A	theory	of	doxastic	justification	should	exclude	such	things	as	deviant	causes.	Similarly,	a	theory	of	attitudinal	justification	for	the	emotions	should	elucidate	the	conditions	that	the	appraisals	involved	in	emotions	should	satisfy	to	produce	well-founded	emotional	responses.9		
2.3.	 Immediate	vs.	Mediate	Justification			 Suppose	that	you	are	attracted	by	a	moderately	foundationalist	epistemology.	On	this	view,	there	is	a	difference	between	basic	and	non-basic	beliefs	(in	the	case	of	doxastic	justification)	and	basic	and	non-basic	propositions	(in	the	case	of	propositional	justification).	A	central	task	for	a	moderately	foundationalist	epistemologist	is	to	draw	these	distinctions	in	a	principled	way.			 Let	us	focus	on	propositional	justification.	The	justification	of	some	propositions	requires	antecedent	justification	to	believe	other	propositions.	If	you	look	at	the	gas	gauge	of	your	car,	you	may	have	justification	to	believe	that	your	car	is	out	of	gas.	Yet,	this	justification	depends	on	your	having	antecedent	justification	to	believe	another	proposition:	that	the	gas	gauge	of	your	car	reads	‘empty’	(Pryor	2005:	182).	We	can	therefore	say	that	the	proposition	that	the	car	is	out	of	gas	is	mediately	justified	for	you.	If	the	justification	of	this	proposition	did	not	depend	on	your	justification	to	believe	other	propositions,	it	would	be																																																									9	If	one	holds	that	emotions	do	not	explicitly	represent	their	formal	objects,	one	should	formulate	propositional	justification	in	a	slightly	different	way.	An	account	of	the	propositional	justification	of	emotions	should	spell	out	the	conditions	under	which	a	
would-be	emotion	with	such	and	such	correctness	conditions	is	permitted.	In	this	case,	the	proposition	in	the	phrase	‘propositional	justification’	should	be	taken	as	describing	those	correctness	conditions	from	an	external	perspective	that	does	not	capture	how	those	correctness	conditions	figure	in	the	would-be	emotion.	See	Roberts	(2003),	for	this	‘external’	use	of	propositions	in	theorizing	on	the	emotions.	
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immediately	justified	for	you.	Here	is	a	plausible	example	of	immediate	justification:	If	you	have	an	experience	as	of	a	light	in	front	of	you,	the	proposition	that	there	is	a	light	in	front	of	you	is	justified	independently	of	whether	other	beliefs	or	propositions	are	also	justified	for	you	(Pryor	2000:	537).		 Some	philosophers	have	rejected	the	idea	of	immediate	justification	(e.g.,	Wright	2007).	It	is	not	my	aim	to	respond	to	those	arguments	but	rather	to	use	the	concept	of	immediate	justification	to	assess	some	existing	theories	of	emotional	justification.	A	moment’s	reflection	suggests	that	most	emotions	cannot	be	immediately	justified.	Consider	pride,	jealousy,	guilt,	and	shame.	These	emotions	rely	on	moral	and	cultural	presuppositions.	Moreover,	they	involve	a	rather	sophisticated	self-concept.	Thus,	we	have	prima	facie	reasons	to	believe	that	their	justification	always	is	mediate.	Suppose	that	I	am	proud	of	the	Lamborghini	that	is	parked	in	front	of	my	house.	If	my	pride	is	justified,	then	the	proposition	<the	Lamborghini	that	is	parked	in	front	of	my	house	enables	me	to	be	seen	in	a	good	light	by	people	I	care	about>	is	justified	for	me	(cf.	Roberts	2003:	275).	Now,	the	justification	of	this	proposition	requires	antecedent	justification	to	believe	at	least	four	other	propositions:	(1)	<there	is	a	Lamborghini	parked	in	front	of	my	house>,	(2)	<I	own	the	Lamborghini	that	is	parked	in	front	of	my	house>,	(3)	<Owning	a	Lamborghini	is	an	achievement>,	and	(4)	<Achievements	enable	their	agents	to	be	seen	in	good	light	by	people	they	care	about>.	Thus,	it	is	reasonable	to	count	this	example	as	a	case	of	mediate	justification.	The	analysis	easily	generalizes	to	other	sophisticated	emotions	like	jealousy,	guilt,	and	shame.	Is	there	immediate	emotional	justification?	The	most	plausible	candidates	for	immediate	emotional	justification	are	psychologists’	basic	emotions.	These	are	evolutionarily	ancient	emotions	that	promote	physical	survival.	They	are	fast,	
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short-term,	and	involve	stereotypical	responses.	They	are	also	processed	in	subcortical	areas	that	are	informationally	encapsulated.	Examples	include	(basic	forms	of)	fear,	anger,	disgust,	joy,	and	sadness	(e.g.,	Ekman	1992;	LeDoux	1996;	Griffiths	1997).10	If	we	follow	the	model	of	perception,	it	is	tempting	to	think	that	even	these	emotions	cannot	be	immediately	justified.	Consider	a	variation	of	Carlos’	fear	of	the	spider	in	the	bathroom.	In	this	case,	he	ignores	the	fact	that	most	spiders	in	New	York	City	are	inoffensive.	If	Carlos’	fear	is	justified,	the	proposition	<the	spider	that	is	in	the	bathroom	is	dangerous>	is	justified	for	him.	Now,	the	justification	of	this	proposition	requires	antecedent	justification	to	believe	at	least	three	other	propositions:	(1)	<The	animal	I	am	looking	at	is	a	spider>,	(2)	<That	spider	is	venomous>,	and	(3)	<Venomous	animals	are	dangerous>.	The	structure	of	this	example	is	analogous	to	the	structure	of	the	gas	gauge	example	above.	Thus,	if	you	have	the	intuition	that	the	latter	is	a	case	of	mediate	justification,	you	should	also	agree	that	fear	is	a	case	of	mediate	justification.	This	cursory	analysis	suggests	that	the	justification	of	any	emotion	will	be	a	rather	complex	matter.	Nevertheless,	there	is	a	way	of	drawing	a	distinction	between	mediate	and	immediate	emotional	justification.	On	this	approach,	the	distinction	is	comparative.	Intuitively,	some	propositions	are	more	mediately	justified	than	the	others.	My	pride	in	the	Lamborghini	that	is	parked	in	front	of	my	house	is	more	mediately	justified	than	Carlos’	fear	of	the	spider	in	the	bathroom.	The	reason	is	straightforward.	The	justification	of	my	pride	in	the	Lamborghini	draws	on	more	epistemic	sources	than	Carlos’	fear	of	the	spider.	My	pride	draws	on	perceptual	recognition,	several	cultural	presuppositions	transmitted	by																																																									10	Some	psychologists	have	tried	to	explain	all	emotions	in	terms	of	basic	emotions.	My	project	is	more	modest.	I	wish	to	ask	whether	these	basic	emotions	are	plausible	candidates	for	immediate	justification.	As	we	shall	see,	this	is	the	most	promising	stance	for	defenders	of	the	simple	view	of	emotional	justification.	
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testimony,	and	a	self-ascription.	By	contrast,	one	might	plausibly	hold	that	Carlos’	fear	only	draws	on	perceptual	recognition.	And	this	is	indirectly	supported	by	the	claim	that	basic	emotions	are	processed	in	subcortical	areas	and	are	informationally	encapsulated.	In	what	follows,	I	will	explore	the	claim	whether	basic	emotions	can	be	immediately	justified	in	the	relative	sense.11	Our	question	is	whether	basic	emotions	can	borrow	their	justification	from	a	single	epistemic	source,	as	the	spider	example	suggests.	As	we	shall	see,	this	is	the	most	promising	interpretation	of	the	simple	view	of	emotional	justification.12		
3. The	Simple	View		 We	have	seen	that	emotions	bear	two	kinds	of	relations	to	other	mental	states	or	episodes:	they	have	subject-matter	givers	and	reason	givers	(Section	1).	This	suggests	a	simple	view	of	emotional	justification.	Cognitive	bases	provide	the	subject	matter	of	emotions.	When	they	do	so,	they	also	provide	reasons	that	confer	justification	on	those	emotions.	Thus,	emotions	borrow	their	justification	from	the	contents	of	their	cognitive	bases	alone.	Let	us	dub	this	‘the	simple	view’	of	emotional	justification.	Peter	Goldie	endorses	the	simple	view:																																																									11	Hereafter,	I	drop	the	adjective	‘relative’.	12	It	might	be	objected	that	the	epistemological	parallelism	between	emotions	and	beliefs	breaks	down	when	we	consider	the	role	of	proportionality	in	emotions.	Consider	an	example	from	Roberts	(2003:	317):	“Al	is	angry	at	Bud	for	putting	a	finger	print	on	the	hood	of	his	1924	Rolls	Royce.	The	intensity	of	his	anger	is	incommensurate	with	the	importance	of	the	offense.	(He	sees	the	offense	as	more	important	than	it	is)”.	On	this	view,	emotions	can	be	assessed	for	proportionality,	while	beliefs	cannot.		I	do	not	need	to	hold	that	the	analogy	between	the	epistemic	roles	of	emotions	and	beliefs	is	perfect	in	order	to	vindicate	the	present	approach.	Nevertheless,	it	is	not	clear	that	proportionality	plays	no	role	in	the	justification	of	beliefs.	Indeed,	one	might	require	that	one’s	degree	of	belief	in	p	be	proportional	to	one’s	evidence	in	favor	of	p	(Wedgwood	Ms.).		
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[A]n	emotional	experience	typically	seems	to	one	to	be	reasonable	or	justified.	But	what	makes	it,	in	fact,	justified?	[A]n	emotion,	if	it	is,	in	fact,	justified,	will	be	justified	by	something	else	external	to	the	emotion	itself	and	the	perception:	it	will	be	justified	by	reasons	[…].	Thus	the	fact	that	the	meat	is	maggot	infested	is	a	reason	that	justifies	[…]	your	feeling	of	disgust	(Goldie	2004:	97–8).		 In	the	same	text,	Goldie	excludes	other	elements	from	the	factors	that	contribute	to	the	justification	of	disgust.	Thus,	on	Goldie’s	view,	the	justification	of	disgust	at	the	meat	supervenes	on	the	subject’s	(awareness	of)	the	fact	that	the	meat	is	maggot	infested.	In	more	recent	work,	Julien	Deonna	and	Fabrice	Teroni	(D&T)	have	defended	a	similar	claim.	They	write:		 An	emotion	is	justified	if,	and	only	if,	in	the	situation	in	which	the	subject	finds	herself,	the	properties	she	is	(or	seems	to	be)	aware	of	and	on	which	her	emotion	is	based	constitute	(or	would	constitute)	an	exemplification	of	the	evaluative	property	that	features	in	the	correctness	conditions	of	the	emotion	she	undergoes	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012:	97).		
	 D&T	illustrate	their	view	with	a	concrete	example:	
	 Suppose	that	a	dog	with	big	teeth	that	is	behaving	in	an	impulsive	way	constitutes,	given	the	circumstances	in	which	the	subject	finds	herself,	a	danger.	The	idea	is	that	her	fear	is	justified	if	it	is	based	on	her	awareness	of	this	dog,	its	big	teeth	and	impulsive	behavior	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012:	97).		
	
	There	is	a	difference	between	Goldie’s	and	D&T’s	accounts.	Whereas	Goldie	spells	out	emotional	justification	in	terms	of	facts,	D&T	add	the	qualifications	
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‘seems	to	be	aware’	and	‘would	constitute’,	which	make	room	for	justified	emotions	based	on	false	or	inaccurate	cognitive	bases.	Given	that	my	arguments	are	neutral	on	these	two	options,	I	propose	to	drop	D&T’s	qualifications.	The	reader	is	invited	to	adjust	my	arguments	to	their	preferred	account.13		Let	us	use	the	distinctions	from	the	previous	section	to	interpret	the	simple	view.		 First,	neither	Goldie	nor	D&T	make	any	claim	about	the	way	emotions	are	formed	on	the	basis	of	their	cognitive	bases.	Thus,	their	accounts	are	most	plausibly	interpreted	as	contributions	to	a	theory	of	propositional	justification.		 Second,	both	Goldie	and	D&T	formulate	their	views	in	relation	to	any	emotion.	This	is	problematic.	It	seems	natural	to	hold	that	only	a	few	emotions	can	be	justified	on	the	sole	basis	of	the	contents	of	their	cognitive	bases.	This	is	indirectly	confirmed	by	the	example	of	pride	from	Section	2.3	and	the	examples	they	give,	which	concern	basic	emotions.	Goldie	thinks	that	one’s	disgust	at	the	meat	depends	on	one’s	justification	for	the	proposition	that	the	meat	is	maggot	infested	and	nothing	else.14	Thus,	his	view	is	best	cashed	out	as	an	account	of	immediate	emotional	justification.	D&T	submit	that	one’s	fear	of	the	dog	depends	on	one’s	justification	for	the	proposition	that	the	dog	has	big	teeth	and	impulsive	behavior	and	nothing	else.15	Thus,	their	view	is	best	cashed	out	as	an	account	of	immediate	emotional	justification.	Other	cases	are	likely	to	display	a	more	complex																																																									13	Some	emotions	are	factive.	Examples	include	regretting	that	p,	being	glad	that	p,	and	being	happy	that	p.	Some	have	argued	that	these	emotions	entail	knowledge	that	p	(Gordon	1987:	26),	while	others	have	suggested	that	they	only	require	that	the	subject	believes	that	she	knows	that	p	(Roberts	2003:	94).	Depending	on	one’s	views	on	the	matter,	one	should	amend	the	simple	view	accordingly.	I	shall	bracket	factive	emotions.	14	For	Goldie,	the	proposition	that	the	meat	is	maggot	infested	is	justified	for	me	because	it	is	a	fact	that	the	meat	is	maggot	infested.	15	D&T	do	not	spell	out	the	conditions	under	which	the	proposition	that	the	dog	has	big	teeth	and	impulsive	behavior	is	justified	for	me.	Presumably,	they	want	their	view	to	be	compatible	with	many	epistemological	accounts.	
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justificatory	structure.	Culturally	dependent	emotions	and	emotions	that	emerge	from	complex	patterns	of	reasoning	will	introduce	other	sources	of	justification	(Section	2.3).	Hence,	we	should	think	of	the	simple	view	as	an	account	of	
immediate	emotional	justification.		 Third,	neither	Goldie	nor	D&T	explain	what	they	mean	by	epistemic	justification.	Given	that	justification	has	been	widely	cashed	out	in	terms	of	permissibility,	I	propose	to	assess	their	views	in	those	terms.	Does	the	simple	view	provide	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	propositional-immediate	emotional	justification	understood	as	epistemic	permissibility?16		If	we	use	D&T’s	account	as	a	template,	we	can	rephrase	the	simple	view	as	the	conjunction	of	a	necessity	and	a	sufficiency	claim:		
	 Necessity	Claim	If	a	subject’s	emotion	is	immediately	justified,	the	subject	is	aware	of	the	properties	that	constitute	an	exemplification	of	the	formal	object	of	the	emotion.	
	 Sufficiency	Claim	If	a	subject	is	aware	of	the	properties	that	constitute	an	exemplification	of	the	formal	object	of	the	emotion,	the	subject’s	emotion	is	immediately	justified.			 Let	us	start	with	the	necessity	claim.	It	is	unclear	whether	Goldie	and	D&T	have	provided	an	exhaustive	characterization	of	the	properties	that	constitute	the	formal	objects	of	disgust	and	fear	respectively.	Suppose	that	basic	forms	of	disgust	track	poisonous	and	infected	food.	Thus,	the	property	of	being	maggot	infested	is																																																									16	Hereafter,	when	I	speak	about	an	emotion	being	justified,	I	refer	to	propositional-immediate	justification.	
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not	sufficient	to	constitute	the	property	of	being	disgusting.	After	all,	the	meat	is	disgusting	relative	to	human	beings	but	not	to	vultures.	Therefore,	there	is	some	pressure	to	include	some	properties	of	human	beings	into	the	properties	that	constitute	the	disgusting	character	of	a	maggot-infested	piece	of	meat.	D&T	are	more	careful	than	Goldie.	They	suggest	that	the	dangerousness	of	a	dog	in	a	situation	is	also	constituted	by	the	fact	that	“the	subject	is	made	of	flesh	and	blood	as	well	as	some	spatial	and	other	relations	between	her	and	the	animal”	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012:	95).17	But	this	raises	a	problem.	If	we	include	relational	properties	into	the	properties	that	constitute	formal	objects,	the	simple	view	seems	to	predict	that	disgust	and	fear	are	almost	never	justified.	After	all,	we	are	not	typically	aware	of	these	relational	properties	when	we	experience	disgust	or	fear.18	There	are	some	ways	of	circumventing	this	problem.	One	might	follow	Setiya	(2012:	40ff.)	and	stipulate	that	the	agent	only	needs	to	have	some	evidence	of	the	instantiation	of	the	properties	that	constitute	the	corresponding	formal	object.	Another	option	would	be	to	hypothesize	that	we	are	unconsciously	aware	of	things	as	standing	in	relevant	relations	to	us	and	that	this	unconscious	awareness	is	all	we	need	for	immediate	emotional	justification.	Alternatively,	one	might	claim	that	a	subject	does	not	need	to	be	aware	of	all	the	properties	that	constitute	danger	for	her	fear	to	be	justified.	This	solution	seems	to	be	implicit	in	D&T’s	formulation.	They	could	reply	that	some	of	these	constitutive	properties	are	best	understood	as	implicit	parameters	of	the	subject’s	situation.		
																																																								17	“[W]e	do	not	suggest	that	the	supervenience	base	for	evaluative	properties	only	comprises	monadic	properties	of	the	relevant	object.	The	supervenience	base	will	typically	comprise	relational	properties	of	this	object	as	well	as	some	properties	of	the	subject	undergoing	the	emotion”	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012:	103	n	4).	18	See	also	McGrath	(forthcoming)	for	additional	worries.	She	presents	her	objections	to	Setiya’s	(2012)	inferential	theory	of	moral	knowledge.	
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Let	us	assume	that	one	of	these	solutions	could	be	worked	out.	Hence,	we	can	rather	focus	on	the	sufficiency	claim:	Is	it	true	that	a	subject’s	awareness	of	the	properties	that	constitute	an	exemplification	of	the	formal	object	of	her	emotion	is	sufficient	for	immediate	justification	of	that	emotion?	My	answer	is	no.	The	sufficiency	claim	leads	to	the	‘gap	problem’.	On	the	plausible	assumption	that	there	is	a	difference	in	the	ways	cognitive	bases	represent	objects	and	their	properties	and	the	ways	emotions	(re)present	evaluative	properties,	it	follows	that	the	cognitive	bases	of	emotions	are	not	sufficient	to	justify	emotional	responses.	To	understand	this	problem,	we	need	a	working	characterization	of	the	relation	between	non-evaluative	and	evaluative	properties	and	non-evaluative	and	evaluative	representational	contents.	There	are	reductive	and	non-reductive	conceptions	of	the	relation	between	non-evaluative	properties	(N-properties)	and	evaluative	properties	(E-properties):	
Non-Reductive	Conceptions.	On	these	views,	N-properties	are	different	from	E-properties.	A	natural	way	of	developing	this	idea	is	to	hold	that	E-properties	are	higher-order	properties	of	N-properties	(e.g.,	Oddie	2005).	
Reductive	Conceptions.	On	these	views,	E-properties	are	identical	to	N-properties.		Goldie	is	not	explicit	on	which	ontological	conception	he	endorses.	D&T	are	attracted	by	a	reductive	view:		 [I]f	danger	is	constituted	by	the	instantiation	of	some	non-evaluative	properties,	
there	is	no	further	fact	of	the	matter,	nothing	more	to	a	specific	danger	than	the	
instantiation	of	what	makes	it	a	danger	[…].	A	specific	instance	of	danger,	loss,	or	offensiveness	is	not	a	further	property	alongside	those	properties	that	constitute	it	(Dancy	1993:	75)	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012:	97;	emphasis	mine).		
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The	arguments	to	follow	generalize	to	both	reductive	and	non-reductive	views.	Moreover,	they	can	be	applied	to	various	conceptions	of	the	relation	between	N-properties	and	E-properties.	Yet,	we	will	gain	in	clarity	if	we	focus	on	a	single	type	of	view.	I	propose	to	focus	on	reductive	accounts	that	exploit	the	constitution	relation.				Anyone	who	endorses	a	reductive	account	of	evaluative	properties	should	accommodate	a	platitude.	Even	if	an	E-property	is	identical	to	an	N-property,	one	can	run	a	Moorean	Open	Question	argument	for	E	and	N:	Is	it	true	that	E	is	N?	(Moore	1903).	It	is	unclear	whether	this	argument	enables	us	to	draw	any	metaphysical	conclusions	about	the	relation	between	E-properties	and	N-properties.	Yet,	this	argument	has	an	epistemic	consequence:	If	it	makes	sense	to	run	a	Moorean	Open	Question	argument	for	E	and	N,	it	follows	that	the	sentence	‘E	is	N’	is	informative.	In	the	Fregean	tradition	(Frege	1892),	if	an	informative	identity	is	flanked	by	two	co-extensional	expressions,	the	extensions	of	these	expressions	are	presented	under	different	modes	of	presentation	(MOPs).		The	Moore-Frege	insight	strongly	suggests	that	one’s	awareness	of	the	instantiation	of	the	N-properties	that	constitute	an	exemplification	of	the	formal	object	of	a	given	emotion	E	is	not	sufficient	to	confer	immediate	propositional	justification	on	E.		Let	us	start	with	an	example	from	a	different	domain.	Intuitively,	water	is	constituted	by	Hydrogen	and	Oxygen.	Still,	being	aware	that	this	stuff	is	H2O	is	not	sufficient	for	an	agent	to	be	permitted	to	conclude	that	this	stuff	is	water.	If	our	agent	were	to	draw	that	conclusion,	she	would	be	jumping	to	conclusions.	Although	water	is	in	fact	H2O,	it	is	unreasonable	for	an	agent	to	conclude	that	this	stuff	is	water	on	the	sole	basis	of	her	awareness	that	this	stuff	is	H2O.	If	an	agent	is	aware	that	this	stuff	is	H2O	but	ignores	that	H2O	is	water,	the	rational	thing	for	her	
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to	do	is	to	suspend	judgment	when	she	is	presented	with	the	content	expressed	by	‘This	is	H2O’	(Frege	1892).	The	simple	view	of	emotional	justification	has	a	similar	structure.	Goldie	and	D&T	hold	that	cognitive	bases	enable	subjects	to	be	aware	of	objects	as	having	some	N-properties.	If	complexes	of	N-properties	are	presented	under	a	mode	of	presentation	that	is	different	from	the	way	formal	objects	are	presented	in	emotional	experiences,	then	the	rational	thing	to	do	when	one	is	aware	of	these	complexes	of	N-properties	is	to	stay	cool	and	withhold	one’s	emotions.	Let	us	develop	this	point	in	some	detail.	We	have	two	options:	either	the	subject	is	aware	of	N-properties	as	N-properties	(i.e.,	under	a	non-evaluative	mode	of	presentation	–	MOPn)	or	as	E-properties	(i.e.,	under	an	evaluative	mode	of	presentation	–	MOPe).	Unfortunately,	the	two	options	lead	to	the	same	result.19		
Non-Evaluative	Modes	of	Presentation.	If	the	subject	is	aware	of	the	N-properties	under	a	non-evaluative	mode	of	presentation,	she	should	find	the	following	question	reasonable:	‘Is	it	true	that	this(MOPn)	is	the	same	as	that(MOPe)?	To	be	permitted	to	respond	with	an	emotion,	our	subject	should	know	that	the	answer	to	this	question	is	‘yes’.	Still,	it	is	unclear	how	the	sole	awareness	of	some	N-properties	under	a	non-evaluative	mode	of	presentation	could	deliver	that	affirmative	answer.	Indeed,	answering	‘yes’	to	this	question	based	only	on	one’s	awareness	of	some	N-properties	under	a	non-evaluative	mode	of	presentation	would	lead	our	agent	to	jump	to	conclusions.	Imagine	an	agent	who	sees	a	dog	with	big	teeth	and	moving	erratically.	Even	if	these	features	do	in	fact	constitute	the	dangerousness	of	the	dog	in	the	current	circumstances,	the	agent’s	sole	awareness	of	the	dog	as	having	big	teeth	and																																																									19	Oliver-Skuse	(2016:	Chapter	2)	reached	a	similar	conclusion	on	different	grounds.	McGrath	(forthcoming)	has	also	developed	a	similar	argument	against	Setiya’s	inferential	account	of	moral	knowledge.	In	the	next	section,	I	argue	that	her	considerations	do	not	lend	support	to	a	perceptual	theory	of	evaluative	experience.	
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moving	erratically	would	not	suffice	to	make	it	reasonable	for	her	to	feel	fear	of	the	dog.	After	all,	some	inoffensive	dogs	have	big	teeth,	while	others	move	erratically	out	of	joy.	More	generally:	If	justification	is	cashed	out	in	terms	of	epistemic	permissibility,	an	agent’s	awareness	of	some	evaluative	properties	under	non-evaluative	modes	of	presentation	is	not	sufficient	for	her	to	be	permitted	to	respond	with	an	emotion	whose	formal	object	is	constituted	by	those	properties.20	Some	might	wonder	whether	this	argument	presupposes	some	form	of	internalism	(Oliver-Skuse	2016:	Chapter	2).	I	agree	that	this	line	of	argument	will	be	more	appealing	to	an	internalist	about	epistemic	justification.	Nevertheless,	I	have	formulated	it	in	such	a	way	that	even	an	externalist	should	recognize	it	as	a	problem.	Indeed,	externalists	should	grant	that	there	are	cases	in	which	we	are	not	permitted	to	jump	to	conclusions.	Thus,	if	the	externalist	sees	no	problem	here,	she	owes	us	an	explanation	of	why	we	are	permitted	to	jump	to	conclusions	in	the	case	of	emotions	but	not	in	other,	structurally	similar	cases.	Before	this	explanation	is	provided,	the	gap	problem	is	still	with	us.21	D&T	have	insisted	that	emotions	do	not	explicitly	represent	evaluative	properties	(Deonna	and	Teroni	2012,	2014,	2015).	Thus,	one	might	think	that	the	argument	does	not	generalize	to	their	view.	I	cannot	evaluate	D&T’s	view	here.	Still,	the	previous	argument	does	apply	to	D&T’s	view.	D&T	endorse	the	cognitivist	claim	that	emotions	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their																																																									20	The	gap	problem	also	arises	for	the	stronger	concept	of	justification	in	terms	of	obligation.	If	some	inoffensive	dogs	have	big	teeth,	while	others	move	erratically	out	of	joy,	it	is	unclear	why	an	agent	ought	to	feel	fear	of	that	dog.	The	gap	problem	also	generalizes	to	non-reductive	views	of	evaluative	properties.	Suppose	that	the	properties	of	having	big	teeth	and	moving	erratically	are	only	correlated	with	the	property	of	being	dangerous.	If	two	properties	F	and	G	are	merely	correlated,	a	subject	is	not	permitted	to	conclude	that	G	is	instantiated	just	because	she	was	aware	of	F.	Something	is	missing.	21	Indeed,	the	view	I	will	recommend	is	compatible	with	externalism	understood	as	the	claim	that	some	of	the	factors	that	determine	justification	are	external	(in	a	suitable	sense	of	‘external’).	See	Section	5.	
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intentional	objects	(Section	1).	In	addition,	they	hold	that	emotions	have	a	phenomenal	character	that	distinguishes	them	from	perception,	memory,	and	beliefs,	which	in	turn	play	the	role	of	cognitive	bases.	Hence,	there	is	a	broad	sense	in	which	cognitive	bases	and	emotions	provide	different	modes	of	access	to	formal	objects.	Thus,	even	if	emotions	do	not	explicitly	represent	formal	objects	under	evaluative	modes	of	presentation,	D&T’s	view	still	faces	the	gap	problem.		 Evaluative	Modes	of	Presentation.	On	this	view,	the	subject	is	aware	of	the	N-properties	that	constitute	the	formal	object	of	her	emotion	E	under	an	evaluative	mode	of	presentation	MOPe	and	this	awareness	confers	justification	on	E.	I	am	not	aware	of	any	well-worked	out	conception	along	these	lines.	Yet,	Michael	Brady’s	(2010,	2013)	recent	work	comes	close	to	this	view.	According	to	Brady,	emotions	motivate	us	to	search	for	considerations	that	bear	on	the	accuracy	of	our	emotional	appraisals.	Emotions	perform	this	feat	by	directing	our	attention	toward	significant	features	of	the	situation.	Suppose	that	you	are	trying	to	get	to	sleep	and	hear	a	noise	downstairs.	You	feel	fear	and	are	motivated	to	seek	out	“considerations	that	have	a	bearing	on	whether	your	initial	emotional	‘take’	on	the	situation,	namely	that	we	are	in	danger,	is	accurate.	[You]	strain	[y]our	ears	to	hear	other	anomalous	noises,	or	rack	[your	brain]	trying	to	think	of	possible	non-threatening	causes	for	the	noise”.	Brady	suggests	that	“it	is	these	considerations	that	provide	us	with	information	about	the	evaluative	realm”	(Brady	2010:	124).	Subsequently,	he	posits	the	existence	of	non-emotional	capacities	to	recognize	the	instantiation	of	evaluative	properties	and	claims	that	those	capacities	are	the	sources	of	justification	of	emotions.		 Brady’s	analysis	is	insightful	in	many	ways.	He	is	right	to	stress	that	emotions	often	motivate	us	to	look	for	reasons.	Nevertheless,	Brady’s	approach	does	not	provide	a	satisfactory	solution	to	the	gap	problem.	
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First,	it	is	a	central	commitment	of	cognitivist	theories	that	emotions	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their	intentional	objects	(Section	1).	If	we	use	Brady’s	view	to	solve	the	gap	problem,	we	must	reject	the	cognitivist	view.	If	we	reject	it,	however,	we	will	need	to	provide	a	different	story	about	the	epistemic	role	of	the	emotions.	One	might	be	tempted	by	Brady’s	contention	that	the	epistemic	role	of	emotions	is	precisely	to	direct	our	attention	to	significant	features	of	the	situation.	Unfortunately,	Brady’s	arguments	for	this	view	are	not	conclusive.	An	initial	worry	is	that	‘significant	features’	seems	to	be	synonymous	with	‘evaluative	properties’.	So,	emotions	cannot	direct	our	attention	to	significant	features	unless	they	are	somehow	sensitive	to	evaluative	properties.	And	being	sensitive	to	evaluative	properties	comes	very	close	to	giving	access	to	evaluative	properties.	Moreover,	it	is	perfectly	consistent	to	hold	that	emotions	often	motivate	us	to	search	for	reasons	without	endorsing	the	stronger	claim	that	they	always	do	so.	This	seems	particularly	clear	in	the	case	of	basic	emotions.	When	I	am	afraid	of	the	dog	and	run	away,	I	have	no	time	to	search	for	reasons	that	bear	on	the	dangerousness	of	the	dog.	Still,	it	is	reasonable	to	hold	that	fear	provided	me	with	epistemic	access	to	the	dangerousness	of	the	dog	and	that	this	access	motivated	me	to	act	in	the	way	I	did.	Crucially,	we	are	interested	in	the	epistemic	justification	of	basic	emotions.	Thus,	any	alternative	account	of	the	epistemic	role	of	emotions	should	generalize	to	basic	emotions.		Third,	even	if	Brady	is	right	to	point	out	that	emotions	are	justified	by	non-emotional	capacities	to	recognize	the	instantiation	of	evaluative	properties,	this	would	not	solve	the	gap	problem.	To	see	why,	it	is	important	to	recall	the	H2O/water	example.	That	example	shows	that	one	can	generate	an	epistemic	gap	outside	the	evaluative	domain.	Intuitively,	the	reason	why	‘H2O’	and	‘water’	refer	
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to	water	under	different	modes	of	presentation	is	that	a	rational	subject	who	ignores	that	‘H2O’	and	‘water’	are	co-extensional	should	suspend	judgment	when	she	is	presented	with	the	identity	sentence	‘H2O	is	water’.	In	other	words,	suspending	judgment	on	that	identity	sentence	is	the	reasonable	thing	to	do	for	that	subject.	Consider	now	Brady’s	proposal.	We	might	think	of	Brady’s	view	as	positing	two	different	modes	of	presentation:	non-emotional	modes	of	presentation	of	evaluative	properties	and	emotional	modes	of	presentation	of	those	evaluative	properties.	Given	that	these	modes	of	presentation	are	different,	a	subject	is	not	permitted	to	move	back	and	forth	from	one	to	the	other	unless	she	has	some	background	information	that	these	modes	of	presentation	are	in	fact	co-extensional.	Unfortunately,	Brady	has	provided	no	story	about	the	sources	of	this	background	information.	To	sum	up,	the	simple	view	holds	that	the	contents	of	cognitive	bases	are	sufficient	to	confer	immediate	propositional	justification	on	basic	emotions.	I	have	explored	two	ways	in	which	cognitive	bases	could	represent	the	properties	that	constitute	the	formal	objects	of	emotions.	Non-evaluative	modes	of	presentation	introduce	Moorean-Fregean	informative	identities.	Thus,	they	predict	that	an	agent	who	is	aware	solely	of	the	properties	that	constitute	the	formal	object	of	her	
would-be	emotion	is	not	permitted	to	respond	with	that	emotion.	Evaluative	modes	of	presentation	face	three	problems:	they	lead	us	to	reject	cognitivism	about	emotions;	they	do	not	seem	to	provide	a	general	account	of	our	access	to	evaluative	properties;	and	they	do	not	solve	the	gap	problem.22																																																										22	Other	philosophers	have	posited	non-emotional	modes	of	access	to	evaluative	properties.	See,	e.g.,	Mulligan	(2009)	and	the	references	therein.	I	have	two	worries	in	relation	to	these	proposals.	First,	I	do	not	find	these	non-emotional	modes	of	access	to	evaluative	properties	intelligible.	Second,	I	am	inclined	to	think	that	these	views	should	be	introduced	only	if	we	have	compelling	reasons	to	think	that	the	cognitivist	view	cannot	be	preserved.	One	of	my	aims	is	to	show	that	the	cognitivist	view	can	be	preserved.	
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4. Inferentialism,	Value	Skepticism,	and	Perceptualism		 An	obvious	strategy	to	solve	the	gap	problem	is	to	introduce	additional	reasons.	Consider	an	analogy.	Intuitively,	the	proposition	<John’s	best	friend	is	coming	to	the	party>	is	not	a	reason	to	believe	the	proposition	<Pat	is	coming	to	the	party>.	If	I	tell	you	that	John’s	best	friend	is	coming	to	the	party,	you	are	not	
permitted	to	conclude	that	Pat	is	coming	to	the	party.	If	you	were	to	do	so,	you	would	be	jumping	to	conclusions.	Still,	the	proposition	<John’s	best	friend	is	coming	to	the	party>	can	become	your	reason	to	believe	the	proposition	<Pat	is	coming	to	the	party>	if	you	are	given	another	reason	that	bridges	the	gap:	<John’s	best	friend	is	Pat>.	Thus,	we	might	want	to	introduce	a	bridge	proposition	that	links	our	non-emotional	access	to	evaluative	properties	via	cognitive	bases	and	the	formal	objects	as	they	figure	in	our	emotional	responses.	Hence,	we	could	solve	the	gap	problem	as	follows:		
Premise	1:	I	am	aware	of	an	object,	o,	as	having	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	
Premise	2:	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	constitute	the	formal	object	of	emotion	E	in	the	current	circumstances.	
Conclusion:	Therefore,	emotion	E	is	permitted	for	me	in	the	current	circumstances.		 This	solution	faces	a	major	problem:	it	leads	to	value	skepticism.	Suppose	that	in	order	to	be	permitted	to	respond	with	emotion	E	to	an	object,	o,	an	agent	needs	to	have	antecedent	justification	for	premise	2.	Thus,	our	agent	needs	to	have	justification	for	the	proposition	that	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	constitute	the	formal	object	of	emotion	E	in	the	current	circumstances.	But	where	does	this	justification	
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come	from?	If	we	do	not	come	up	with	a	plausible	explanation,	value	skepticism	follows.	This	justification	cannot	come	from	emotion	E,	for	E	only	provides	epistemic	access	to	its	own	formal	object.	If	this	justification	comes	from	a	different	source,	it	seems	that	there	is	a	way	of	having	epistemic	access	to	the	formal	object	of	E	that	does	not	require	E.	Thus,	it	is	at	best	unclear	why	we	should	still	hold	the	cognitivist	view	of	emotions.					It	might	be	thought	that	the	gap	problem	and	value	skepticism	only	arise	for	those	views	that	conceive	of	the	epistemic	role	of	emotions	on	the	model	of	belief.23	Thus,	one	might	want	to	avoid	the	problems	so	far	by	conceiving	of	the	emotions	on	the	model	of	perceptual	experiences.	Unfortunately,	the	gap	problem	still	arises	for	this	family	of	views	in	a	different	guise.	Here	are	two	representative	examples	of	perceptual	theories:		 I	will	reserve	expressions	of	the	form	‘I	see	x	as	A,’	where	A	is	a	thick	affective	concept,	for	those	cases	in	which	the	thing	I	see	as	A	is	the	intentional	object	of	an	emotional	state.	So	when	I	see	something	as	rude	I	am	in	a	distinctive	emotional	state.	An	emotion	is	therefore	a	unitary	state	that	has	both	a	cognitive	aspect	and	an	affective	aspect	that	are	necessarily	connected.	An	emotion	is	a	state	of	feeling	a	characteristic	way	about	something	seen	as	rude,	as	pitiful,	as	contemptible,	and	so	on	(Zagzebski	2003:	114).		According	to	the	so-called	Perceptual	Account,	emotions	are	a	kind	of	perception:	they	represent	their	objects	in	certain	ways.	What	is	specific	about	emotions	is	that	they	represent	things	as	having	certain	evaluative	properties	(Tappolet	2011:	120;	see	also	Döring	2007;	Goldie	2000,	2004).			 Perceptual	theories	of	emotions	share	a	core	perceptual	claim:																																																										23	This	is	a	key	assumption	of	McGrath’s	(forthcoming)	defense	of	moral	perception.	If	the	arguments	to	follow	are	correct,	McGrath’s	diagnosis	is	mistaken.		
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	 Core	Perceptual	Claim	Emotions	are	experiences	that	represent	their	objects	under	evaluative	modes	of	presentation.	These	evaluative	modes	of	presentation	(partly)	explain	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	emotions,	i.e.	what	it	is	like	to	have	them.		 One	might	think	that	nothing	that	falls	short	of	an	emotional-evaluative	mode	of	presentation	can	suffice	to	justify	basic	emotions.	In	other	words,	we	need	to	posit	an	awareness	of	formal	objects	under	evaluative	modes	of	presentation	that	also	explain	the	phenomenal	character	of	emotions.	This	move	solves	our	problem,	not	by	bridging	the	gap,	but	by	eliminating	it.	It	also	avoids	value	skepticism	by	positing	a	perceptual	mode	of	access	to	evaluative	properties.	On	close	inspection,	however,	perceptual	theories	do	not	solve	the	gap	problem.	Even	if	we	endorse	a	perceptual	account	of	emotions,	there	is	still	a	sense	in	which	our	emotional	experiences	do	not	provide	a	basic	mode	of	access	to	the	world.	Even	perceptual	theorists	have	recognized	this	point.	Thus,	McDowell	(1985)	grants	that,	contrary	to	sensory	qualities,	values	do	not	stand	in	causal	relations	to	us.	Even	if	they	did,	their	causal	relation	to	our	affective	systems	must	be	indirect.	This	point	dovetails	with	the	claim	that	emotional	responses	are	
grounded	in	our	non-evaluative	modes	of	access	to	the	world	(Section	1).	On	the	plausible	assumption	that	this	grounding	relation	is	not	primitive,	we	should	elucidate	it.24	It	is	natural	to	think	of	the	emotions	on	the	model	of	high-level	perception.	If	high-level	properties	are	properties	“other	than	color,	shape,	illumination,	motion,	and	their	co-instantiation	in	objects”	(Siegel	2006:	481),	evaluative																																																									24	There	are	different	ways	of	cashing	out	the	concept	of	grounding.	It	will	do	no	harm	to	our	discussion	if	we	work	with	an	intuitive	understanding	of	this	concept.	
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properties	are	high-level	properties.	On	this	approach,	emotional	experiences	bear	structural	similarities	to	the	experiences	of	expert	birdwatchers	when	they	visually	recognize	birds:	their	visual	recognition	of	a	bird	as	a	canary	is	phenomenally	immediate.	The	trouble	here	is	that	high-level	contents	such	as	‘canary’	are	not	representationally	basic.	Indeed,	when	we	perceptually	represent	a	high-level	content,	we	do	so	in	virtue	of	representing	more	basic	contents	(Pryor	2000:	539).	If	I	visually	represent	a	tomato,	I	do	so	in	virtue	of	representing	its	shape,	color,	and	texture.	Therefore,	even	if	the	subject	may	be	unable	to	tell	which	low-level	properties	ground	her	high-level	experiences,	perceptual	theorists	owe	us	an	account	of	how	high-level	emotional	modes	of	presentation	can	be	grounded	in	low-level	contents	and	whether	this	transition	from	low-	to	high-level	contents	can	have	a	deleterious	effect	on	epistemic	justification.	Another	popular	idea	is	to	say	that	emotional	experiences	have	a	structure	analogous	to	what	Wittgenstein	(1953)	called	‘seeing	as’	(Roberts	2003;	Zagzebski	2003).	Consider	the	famous	duck-rabbit	diagram.	This	diagram	illustrates	the	claim	that	one	can	experience	the	same	entity	in	different	ways:	as	a	duck	or	as	a	rabbit.	Similarly,	one	might	hold	that,	when	I	feel	angry	at	John’s	sexist	joke,	I	‘see’	John’s	joke	as	offensive.	Yet,	it	would	be	unsatisfactory	to	leave	things	there.	We	still	need	an	account	of	how	this	aspectual	seeing	is	grounded	in	a	more	basic	representation.	If	we	see	a	diagram	as	a	rabbit,	we	must	explain	how	this	way	of	seeing	the	diagram	is	grounded	in	our	experience	of	its	geometrical	properties.	An	explanation	might	go	as	follows:	the	elongated	shapes	are	like	the	ears	of	rabbits,	its	commissure	is	like	a	rabbit’s	mouth,	the	dot	is	like	a	rabbit’s	eye	seen	from	one	side,	and	so	on.	These	geometrical	configurations	impose	limits	on	the	permissible	interpretations.	You	see	the	figure	as	a	rabbit	because	you	are	already	familiar	with	the	relevant	properties	of	rabbits	and	can	exploit	those	similarities	to	see	the	
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diagram	as	a	rabbit.	If	emotions	have	the	same	structure	as	Wittgenstein’s	‘seeing	as’,	we	should	provide	an	account	of	how	one’s	awareness	of	the	low-level	properties	of	the	situation	constrain	the	permissible	emotional	responses.	In	our	example	of	basic	fear,	we	should	explain	how	an	agent’s	awareness	of	the	teeth	and	erratic	behavior	of	the	dog	constrains	the	permissible	emotions	toward	the	dog,	so	that	fear	is	justified	while	joy	is	not.		 In	sum,	inferential	solutions	lead	either	to	value	skepticism	or	the	rejection	of	cognitivism,	for	they	rely	on	a	bridge	premise	that	cannot	be	justified	by	cognitivist	lights.	Perceptual	theories	of	emotions	could	only	avoid	this	problem	if	they	managed	to	explain	how	our	evaluative	perceptual	experiences	are	grounded	in	representations	with	low-level	contents.25	In	the	next	section,	I	propose	a	solution	to	the	gap	problem	that	does	not	fall	prey	to	value	skepticism	and	discharges	some	of	the	explanatory	requirements	of	perceptual	theories.	My	solution	can	be	integrated	within	any	broadly	cognitivist	theory	of	emotions.			
5. Solving	the	Gap	Problem			 The	gap	problem	has	three	roots:			 1) The	claim	that	emotions	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their	intentional	objects.	2) The	claim	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes	that	represent	the	intentional	objects	of	emotions	in	a	non-emotional	way.																																																										25	My	point	is	not	that	the	account	of	how	emotions	are	grounded	in	representations	with	low-level	contents	cannot	be	given;	it	is	rather	that	it	has	not	been	given.	It	is	only	after	having	provided	the	account	that	perceptual	theorists	may	claim	to	have	solved	the	gap	problem.		
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3) The	claim	that	some	emotions	are	immediately	justified	in	the	weak	sense	of	borrowing	their	justification	from	their	cognitive	bases	alone.		One	might	want	to	reject	one	of	these	assumptions.	I	want	to	preserve	cognitivism	because	I	am	not	aware	of	any	alternative	characterization	of	the	epistemic	role	of	emotions	that	is	both	plausible	and	well	worked	out.	I	also	find	it	uncontroversial	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes	that	represent	the	intentional	objects	of	emotions	in	a	non-emotional	way.	Thus,	I	will	modify	assumption	3:	it	is	true	that	some	emotions	are	more	immediately	justified	than	others.	This	claim	is	particularly	plausible	in	the	case	of	basic	emotions,	which	are	processed	in	subcortical	areas	that	are	informationally	encapsulated.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	mistake	to	hold	that	those	emotions	borrow	their	justification	from	their	cognitive	bases	alone.	My	suggestion	is	to	rethink	the	way	in	which	emotions	are	grounded.	Roughly,	emotions	are	manifestations	of	emotional	dispositions.	These	emotional	dispositions	are	keyed	to	some	non-evaluative	properties	that	are	given	to	us	via	the	cognitive	bases	of	emotions.	Other	things	being	equal,	if	the	agent	is	aware	of	the	instantiation	of	these	non-evaluative	properties,	she	will	respond	emotionally	to	the	intentional	object.	Thus,	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	results	from	the	interplay	of	cognitive	bases	and	emotional	dispositions.	Emotional	responses	are	the	synthesis	of	these	two	sources.	My	proposal	is	that	we	can	exploit	this	psychological	structure	to	capture	the	distinction	between	the	justification	of	basic	emotions	and	the	justification	of	more	sophisticated	emotions.26	Crucially,	the	appeal	to	emotional	dispositions	dispels	some	of	the	mystery	that	surrounds	our	epistemic																																																									26	I	will	try	to	solve	the	problem	of	propositional	emotional	justification	by	reflecting	on	the	psychological	structure	of	emotional	responses.	This	view	is	available	to	anyone	who	holds	that	attitudinal	justification	is	more	fundamental	than	propositional	justification.	See	footnote	8.	
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access	to	evaluative	properties.	Thus,	even	if	one	is	attracted	by	a	perceptual	account,	one	ought	to	introduce	emotional	dispositions	into	the	structure	of	emotional	justification.	I	propose	to	develop	these	two	points	by	reflecting	on	a	concrete	example.27		Consider	three	different	situations:		
Situation	1:	You	are	seeing	a	gorilla	in	the	zoo.	Believing	that	it	is	safely	behind	the	bars,	you	form	the	judgment:	‘That	gorilla	is	dangerous’.	
Situation	2:	You	suddenly	realize	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open.	This	has	an	immediate	impact	on	your	evaluation.	You	move	from	the	initially	cold	evaluative	judgment	to	feeling	fear	of	the	gorilla.	
Situation	3:	Your	friend	Peter	has	worked	in	the	zoo	for	many	years.	He	fed	the	gorilla	when	its	mother	abandoned	it	and	has	been	feeding	it	since	then.	When	Peter	suddenly	realizes	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open,	he	stays	calm	but	rushes	to	close	it.	‘The	gorilla	is	dangerous…	someone	might	be	injured’,	he	thinks.28			 Goldie	has	used	similar	examples	to	defend	the	claim	that	emotions	represent	objects	under	de	se	modes	of	presentation.	We	can	use	our	examples	to	defend	a	different	claim.	In	the	three	situations,	the	cognitive	basis	(visual	perception)	provides	the	subject	matter	of	all	the	evaluations.	All	these	evaluations	are	about	the	gorilla.	Nevertheless,	there	are	crucial	differences.	Whereas	you	are																																																									27	Dispositions	have	also	figured	in	the	work	of	some	perceptual	theorists,	including	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	(2010),	Goldie	(2007),	Jacobson	(2005),	McDowell	(1985,	1987),	and	Roberts	(2003).	They	either	invoke	them	as	existence	conditions	of	emotions	or	as	parts	of	a	theory	of	evaluative	judgment.	My	contribution	is	the	introduction	of	dispositions	to	solve	the	gap	problem,	which	arises	for	emotional	justification.		28	The	cases	are	inspired	from	Goldie	(2000:	61),	who	developed	them	on	the	basis	of	similar	examples	from	Perry	(1979).	See	also	Döring	(2007:	373).	
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disposed	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	(Situation	2),	your	friend	is	not	disposed	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	(Situation	3).	Situations	1	and	2	are	different	too.	Your	disposition	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	is	keyed	to	some	features	of	the	situation.	In	this	case,	your	noticing	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open	triggers	the	fear	experience.		 I	propose	to	think	of	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	on	the	model	of	Situation	2.	Situation	2	lends	credibility	to	the	claim	that	the	emotional	response	is	grounded	in	its	cognitive	basis	and	an	emotional	disposition.	The	emotional	disposition	explains	why	you	do	not	feel	fear	in	Situation	1.	In	that	case,	you	did	not	represent	a	triggering	condition	of	your	disposition	to	feel	fear	of	gorillas.	This	also	explains	the	difference	between	you	and	Peter.	Peter	has	a	slightly	different	emotional	disposition;	that	is	why	he	can	issue	a	cold	evaluation.	Crucially,	the	proposed	view	dispels	some	of	the	mystery	lurking	in	our	access	to	evaluative	properties.	Your	emotional	disposition	is	not	directly	triggered	by	the	perception	of	danger,	as	if	you	had	an	arcane	sense	that	is	put	into	operation	by	the	detection	of	instances	of	danger.	Your	emotional	disposition	is	rather	triggered	by	a	non-evaluative	property	of	the	door	(being	left	open).	There	is	no	inherent	difficulty	in	understanding	how	we	could	have	epistemic	access	to	that	property.	Thus,	the	proposed	approach	also	indicates	how	we	can	improve	upon	perceptual	accounts	of	emotions.	The	property	<The	door	to	the	cage	being	left	open>	signals	the	dangerousness	of	the	gorilla	in	that	situation.	Thus,	emotions	stand	in	at	least	two	sorts	of	grounding	relations	with	their	cognitive	bases.	First,	cognitive	bases	provide	the	emotions	with	their	intentional	objects.	Second,	they	deliver	representations	of	properties	that	signal	the	instantiation	of	the	evaluative	
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properties	that	figure	in	the	correctness	conditions	of	the	corresponding	emotions.29	Consider	now	the	concept	of	justification	as	permissibility.	The	gap	problem	relies	on	the	intuition	that	we	are	not	permitted	to	jump	to	conclusions.	This	gap	is	absent	from	deductive	transitions.	Why	is	the	transition	from	p,	<if	p,	then	q>	to	q	permitted?	Part	of	the	answer	is	that	q	seems	follow	from	p	and	<if	p,	then	q>.	In	other	words,	q	seems	to	be	contained	in	p	and	<if	p,	then	q>.	We	cannot	avail	ourselves	of	the	concept	of	logical	consequence	in	the	context	of	ampliative	transitions,	i.e.	transitions	where	the	content	of	the	end	state	goes	beyond	the	content	of	the	initial	state.	Nevertheless,	we	have	something	similar	at	our	disposal.	Consider	the	case	of	perceptual	recognition.	Intuitively,	expertise	is	a	way	of	achieving	phenomenologically	seamless	transitions,	i.e.	transitions	that	strike	us	as	‘obvious’	from	the	first-person	perspective.	The	perceptual	judgment	‘this	is	a	canary’	is	reasonable	by	the	ornithologist’s	lights	because	she	can	seamlessly	move	from	the	detection	of	the	low-level	properties	of	some	birds	to	the	recognition	of	those	birds	as	canaries.	For	the	ornithologist,	a	bird	with	such	and	such	low-level	properties	is	a	canary.	The	very	same	transition	does	not	seem	obvious	to	me.	Since	I	cannot	tell	a	finch	from	a	canary,	I	am	aware	of	a	gap	between	my	perception	of	those	same	low-level	properties	and	different	possible	categorizations	of	the	bird.	Thus,	I	would	have	to	make	a	guess	or	inference	to	categorize	the	bird.	The	suggestion	is	that	these	phenomenological	considerations	
																																																								29	The	proposed	view	differs	from	Prinz’s	(2004),	who	thinks	of	emotions	as	bodily	feelings	that	have	the	function	of	indicating	the	instantiation	of	core	relational	themes.	In	my	view,	it	is	not	bodily	feelings	but	rather	properties	of	the	situation	that	signal	the	instantiation	of	formal	objects.	These	properties	should	bear	some	salient	relation	to	the	intentional	object.	In	the	case	at	hand,	I	am	afraid	of	the	gorilla.	My	fear	is	directed	at	the	gorilla	because	I	detected	a	property	that	bears	a	close	relation	to	it:	the	door	to	its	cage	being	left	open.	I	am	therefore	compelled	to	ascribe	a	different	role	to	bodily	feelings.	My	hypothesis	is	that	bodily	feelings	enable	us	to	regulate	our	emotions	and	self-ascribe	them.	
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are	not	accidental.	Expert	birdwatchers	have	achieved	high	reliability	in	bird	recognition.	This	high	reliability	is	reflected	in	the	phenomenology	of	perceptual	recognition,	i.e.	in	how	expert	birdwatchers	experience	the	transition	from	the	representation	of	low-level	properties	to	the	representation	of	high-level	properties.30		Something	similar	occurs	in	our	most	basic	emotional	responses.	Presumably,	our	basic	emotional	dispositions	have	been	developed	through	long	evolutionary	processes	in	relatively	stable	environments.	Some	of	these	emotional	dispositions	can	also	be	shaped	and	modified	through	learning,	therapy	or	habit	(as	in	Situation	3).	Once	we	are	endowed	with	the	relevant	dispositions,	the	emotional	responses	they	ground	are	permitted	from	the	first-person	perspective.	If	you	have	the	emotional	disposition	that	grounds	your	fear,	you	cannot	even	raise	the	Moorean	question:	‘But	is	it	true	that	the	gorilla	is	dangerous?’	There	is	no	phenomenal	gap	between	your	awareness	of	the	gorilla	in	a	non-emotional	way	and	your	awareness	of	the	gorilla	in	an	emotional	way.	You	seamlessly	move	from	your	perceptual	representation	of	the	gorilla	to	an	emotional	experience	of	fear	of	the	gorilla.	You	seamlessly	move	from	perception	to	the	action	tendencies	that	characterize	fear.	Deonna	and	Teroni	(2012:	80)	capture	this	point	in	an	insightful	way:	“[you]	feel	the	way	[your]	body	is	poised	to	act	in	a	way	that	will	contribute	to	the	neutralization	of	what	provokes	the	fear”.	Similarly,	when	you	find	the	joke	funny,	you	cannot	help	laughing	at	it.	Your	representation	of	the	situation	described	by	the	joke	seamlessly	leads	to	amusement	at	the	joke.	If	you	could	stop																																																									30	There	is	a	lively	debate	on	how	exactly	to	account	for	the	phenomenology	of	expert	perceptual	recognition.	Although	all	parties	agree	that	expertise	leads	to	a	change	in	the	
overall	phenomenal	character	of	one’s	visual	experience,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	best	to	explain	this	overall	phenomenal	change	(Siegel	2010).	My	talk	about	‘seamless	transitions’	is	intended	to	capture	the	uncontroversial	claim	that	the	way	we	move	from	perception	to	recognition	changes	with	expertise.	Experts	experience	those	transitions	as	phenomenally	seamless;	those	same	moves	strike	the	non-experts	as	having	gaps	that	must	be	sewn	together	by	bridge	principles.		
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somewhere	in	between,	you	did	not	get	the	joke	or	were	not	epistemically	permitted	to	laugh	at	it.	These	remarks	suggest	a	new	picture	of	the	way	emotions	provide	us	with	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	It	is	a	mistake	to	try	to	assign	the	responsibility	for	this	access	to	a	single	entity,	either	the	cognitive	basis	or	the	emotion.	Instead,	that	epistemic	access	is	a	joint	endeavor.	It	is	achieved	when	the	agent	moves	from	the	detection	of	the	trigger	of	the	emotional	disposition	to	some	action	tendencies.	Thus,	accessing	an	evaluative	property	is	not	passively	recognizing	a	property	of	the	intentional	object.	It	is	rather	a	transition	from	a	cognitive	basis	to	an	actualization	of	an	emotional	disposition.		I	have	developed	these	suggestions	by	reflecting	on	the	processes	that	lead	to	specific	emotional	responses.	This	might	seem	to	contradict	the	original	aim	of	dealing	with	propositional	justification.	Yet,	the	problem	is	just	apparent.	Indeed,	some	philosophers	hold	that	attitudinal	justification	is	more	fundamental	than	propositional	justification	(see	Goldman	1986,	for	the	priority	of	doxastic	justification	over	propositional	justification).	We	can	therefore	generalize	these	lessons	to	propositional	justification	by	formulating	a	counterfactual	analysis.	We	can	solve	the	gap	problem	as	follows:		
	 Basic	Emotional	Justification	If	a	subject	S’s	basic	emotion	E	about	an	object,	o,	is	justified,	then:	-	S	is	(or	seems	to	be)	aware	of	o	as	having	some	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	-	S	has	a	set	of	emotional	dispositions	that,	other	things	being	equal,	would	lead	her	to	move	from	the	detection	of	F,	G,	H…	to	the	corresponding	emotion	E.	
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-	If	the	emotional	response	were	to	occur,	S	would	experience	the	transition	from	the	cognitive	basis	to	the	emotion	as	a	phenomenologically	seamless	transition.			 It	is	worth	making	two	remarks	on	this	analysis.	First,	I	have	not	offered	
sufficient	conditions	for	emotional	justification.	The	reason	is	that	a	complete	account	of	emotional	justification	should	be	supplemented	with	a	theory	of	emotional	dispositions.	This	theory	should	be	further	tested	by	its	capacity	to	deal	with	defeaters,	‘barn’	cases,	and	similar	scenarios	that	have	been	discussed	in	the	epistemological	literature.	I	will	say	something	about	this	program	in	the	next	section.	Second,	Deonna	and	Teroni	(2012:	104–17)	have	offered	a	battery	of	arguments	to	the	effect	that	dispositions	such	as	moods,	sentiments,	and	character	traits	do	not	positively	contribute	to	the	justification	of	emotions.	These	arguments	deserve	to	be	examined.	Unfortunately,	I	do	not	have	sufficient	space	to	discuss	them	here.	I	will	rather	spend	some	time	responding	to	some	specific	objections	to	the	current	approach.			
6. Objections	and	Replies	
	
Objection	1:	It	could	be	objected	that	the	dispositional	view	is	not	an	alternative	to	inferentialism	but	rather	a	version	of	it.	Indeed,	one	might	claim	that,	even	if	an	emotional	response	is	grounded	in	a	corresponding	emotional	disposition,	the	subject	still	needs	antecedent	justification	to	believe	a	bridge	proposition	of	the	form:	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	constitute	the	formal	object	of	emotion	E	in	the	current	circumstances.	
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Reply:	This	objection	would	lead	us	back	to	value	skepticism	(Section	4).	I	have	assumed	that	value	skepticism	is	not	a	desirable	position.	Still,	my	goal	was	not	the	ambitious	one	of	refuting	value	skepticism	but	rather	the	modest	one	of	sketching	an	account	of	emotional	justification	that	does	not	have	skeptical	consequences.	And	inferentialism	has	skeptical	consequences.	Thus,	our	question	is:	Are	there	reasonable	grounds	to	think	that	the	dispositional	account	does	not	have	skeptical	consequences?	My	answer	is	‘yes’.	Indeed,	a	generalized	form	of	inferentialism	would	lead	to	a	highly	unstable	position.	To	begin	with,	notice	that	there	are	plenty	of	ampliative	transitions	in	our	mental	life	that	are	not	plausibly	construed	along	inferential	lines.	Yet,	we	have	the	strong	intuition	that	those	ampliative	transitions	are	epistemically	permissible.	If	you	see	a	red	square	and	a	blue	circle,	your	visual	system	moved	from	sensory	states	that	detect	redness,	squareness,	blueness,	and	circularity	to	other	sensory	states	that	represent	a	red	square	and	a	blue	circle.	This	transition	is	ampliative	because	your	visual	system	had	to	go	beyond	the	deliverances	of	feature	detectors.	After	all,	the	detection	of	redness,	squareness,	blueness,	and	circularity	could	correspond	to	a	scene	containing	a	blue	square	and	a	red	circle	or	a	scene	containing	four	scattered	properties.	Still,	this	transition	strikes	most	non-skeptics	as	epistemically	permissible.	Crucially,	it	is	implausible	to	hold	that	taking	the	binding	of	these	features	at	face	value	is	justified	because	we	have	antecedent	justification	to	believe	a	background	proposition,	as	the	inferential	model	would	predict.	A	more	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	we	are	endowed	with	dispositions	to	bind	different	features	into	object	representations.	If	we	do	not	posit	these	dispositions,	we	will	be	led	to	the	troubling	conclusion	that	even	primitive	perceptual	propositions	such	as	<This	is	a	red	square>	cannot	be	epistemically	justified	by	perception	alone.	
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After	all,	it	is	unclear	how	the	proposition	<This	square	goes	together	with	that	instance	of	redness>	could	be	epistemically	justified.	My	suggestion	is	that	something	similar	holds	for	basic	emotions.	Emotions	such	as	fear	have	correctness	conditions	that	feature	formal	objects.	Basic	emotions	are	partly	justified	by	basic	dispositions	to	bind	those	formal	objects	to	their	intentional	objects.	These	basic	dispositions	are	triggered	by	non-evaluative	properties	that	bear	salient	relations	to	the	emotions’	intentional	object.31	
Objection	2:	Some	readers	might	protest	that	the	dispositional	account	faces	a	circularity	problem.	Indeed,	one	might	contend	that	our	understanding	of	emotional	dispositions	is	parasitic	on	our	understanding	of	emotional	episodes.	To	illustrate,	the	emotional	disposition	that	grounds	fear	is	to	be	understood	as	a	disposition	to	feel	fear	in	dangerous	situations.	Thus,	it	is	a	mistake	to	hold	that	fear	is	grounded	in	an	emotional	disposition.		
Reply:	I	can	grant	that	our	understanding	of	emotional	dispositions	is	parasitic	on	our	understanding	of	emotional	episodes.	Yet,	this	does	not	prevent	the	dispositional	view	from	offering	an	informative	account	of	emotional	justification.	Indeed,	it	is	possible	to	characterize	emotional	dispositions	in	ways	that	go	beyond	specific	emotional	episodes,	and	these	characterizations	are	epistemically	significant.	Thus,	Mulligan	(1998:	163)	suggests	that	sentiments	“fix	the	range	of	variation	of	a	subject’s”	emotional	responses.32	Similarly,	Roberts	(2003:	142)	describes	the	broader	category	of	a	concern	“as	a	principle	of	predilection	of	a	range	of	widely	various	emotional	responses”.	Thus,	one	might	think	of	emotional	dispositions	as	providing	templates	that	determine	the	ways	in	
																																																								31	This	is	a	very	special	kind	of	binding.	In	my	view,	it	is	phenomenologically	realized	in	our	experience	of	action	tendencies.	I	leave	this	issue	for	another	occasion.		32	Mulligan	(1998)	does	not	construe	sentiments	as	bases	of	emotions	but	as	bases	of	intentions	and	wantings.	Thus,	his	view	faces	the	gap	problem.	
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which	a	subject	would	react	to	some	types	of	events	or	situations.	An	epistemological	theory	of	emotional	dispositions	could	therefore	examine	the	conditions	under	which	these	templates	are	epistemically	good	or	bad.	It	is	obvious	that	some	emotional	dispositions	are	epistemically	bad.	Love	often	leads	to	unwarranted	admiration	and	being	timid	often	leads	to	feel	fear	of	inoffensive	objects	and	situations.	A	theory	of	emotional	justification	could	therefore	identify	commonalities	between	these	templates	and	use	them	to	identify	the	conditions	under	which	an	emotional	disposition	is	epistemically	good	or	bad.	It	could	also	describe	some	general	features	of	the	acquisition	of	emotional	dispositions	by	evolution,	habit	or	education.	Presumably,	some	modes	of	acquisition	may	negatively	or	positively	affect	emotional	justification.33		
Objection	3:	Some	readers	might	complain	that	the	dispositional	account	faces	a	problem	analogous	to	a	famous	problem	faced	by	psychological	behaviorism.	Arguably,	it	is	not	always	possible	to	specify	the	triggering	conditions	of	emotional	dispositions	in	non-evaluative	terms.	
Reply:	I	do	not	claim	that	the	triggering	conditions	of	all	emotional	dispositions	can	be	specified	in	non-evaluative	terms.	Indeed,	some	of	them	may	be	based	on	representations	with	evaluative	contents.	As	an	illustration,	many	people	have	experienced	indignation	at	Donald	Trump’s	election	because	they	judge	him	to	be	unworthy	of	being	the	US	president.	More	generally,	many	emotions	can	be	based	on	judgments	of	value.	My	point	is	rather	that	the	triggering	conditions	of	several	emotional	dispositions	can	be	specified	in	non-evaluative	terms.	This	is	all	we	need	to	avoid	value	skepticism	while	dispelling	some	of	the	mystery	that	surrounds	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	The	case	of																																																									33	Virtue	epistemology	would	be	a	natural	starting	point	to	pursue	these	inquiries.	I	think	that	current	accounts	of	epistemic	and	moral	virtues	will	benefit	from	a	closer	examination	of	emotional	justification.	
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the	gorilla	is	a	representative	example	of	this	idea.	Once	we	think	about	the	structure	of	this	case,	it	is	not	difficult	to	come	up	with	many	other	examples.	A	rat’s	fear	of	an	imminent	electroshock	can	be	keyed	to	its	hearing	of	a	beep,	which	is	specifiable	in	non-evaluative	terms.	An	animal’s	fear	and	avoidance	responses	can	be	keyed	to	the	colors	of	poisonous	substances.	Similarly,	episodes	of	grief	and	longing	can	be	triggered	by	the	perceptual	recognition	of	the	beloved’s	belongings,	which	do	not	need	to	be	described	in	evaluative	terms;	they	are	just	tightly	associated	with	the	beloved	one.		
	
7. Concluding	Remarks		 The	simple	view	of	emotional	justification	holds	that	the	justification	of	some	emotions	supervenes	on	the	content	of	their	cognitive	bases	alone.	I	introduced	a	series	of	epistemological	distinctions	to	clarify	the	scope	of	the	simple	view.	The	simple	view	is	most	plausibly	construed	as	an	account	of	immediate	propositional	justification	understood	as	epistemic	permissibility.	This	restricted	thesis	faces	the	gap	problem:	If	there	is	a	difference	in	the	ways	cognitive	bases	represent	objects	and	properties	and	the	ways	the	emotions	(re)present	the	evaluative	properties	of	those	objects,	the	simple	view	has	failed	to	provide	sufficient	conditions	for	emotional	justification.	I	considered	various	ways	of	solving	the	gap	problem	and	found	them	wanting.	The	purported	solutions	either	lead	to	value	skepticism,	or	contradict	cognitivism,	or	are	not	sufficiently	illuminating.		One	might	solve	the	gap	problem	by	rejecting	cognitivism	or	the	claim	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes.	I	proposed	a	more	conservative	view.	I	preserved	the	intuition	that	some	emotions	are	more	
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immediately	justified	than	others	by	introducing	a	dispositional	model	of	our	access	to	evaluative	properties.	On	this	view,	subjects	have	emotional	dispositions	that,	in	conjunction	with	the	contents	of	emotions’	cognitive	bases,	can	confer	immediate	emotional	justification.	Emotional	dispositions	explain	how	one	can	have	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	without	being	able	to	literally	detect	those	evaluative	properties.	They	also	explain	why	emotional	responses	seem	to	be	permissible	from	the	first-person	perspective.		It	is	an	open	question	how,	on	the	proposed	account,	emotions	contribute	to	the	justification	of	evaluative	judgments.	This	is	a	difficult	issue	that	should	be	tackled	by	analyzing	the	representational	structure	of	emotions.	It	is	worth	stressing,	however,	that	the	proposed	account	offers	a	contribution	of	broader	interest	to	epistemology:	it	provides	a	series	of	cases	in	which	immediate	justification	does	not	require	that	the	representational	content	of	the	justifier	mental	state	be	identical	to	the	content	of	the	justified	mental	state	or	episode.	Thus,	philosophers	interested	in	the	scope	of	immediate	justification	should	pay	closer	attention	to	the	epistemology	of	emotions.34		 																																																									34	I	am	extremely	grateful	to	Julien	Deonna	and	Fabrice	Teroni	for	helping	me	find	my	way	through	the	intricate	literature	on	emotions.	Special	thanks	are	due	to	the	participants	at	the	workshop	Experience,	Values,	and	Justification	(Geneva,	2-3	June	2016)	for	their	probing	questions	and	remarks,	especially	to	Berit	Brogaard,	Elijah	Chudnoff,	David	Faraci,	Karen	Jones,	Federico	Lauria,	Moritz	Müller,	and	Peter	Railton.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Richard	Dub	for	several	stimulating	conversations	on	the	emotions,	Arturs	Logins	for	advice	on	epistemic	matters,	and	Tristram	Oliver-Skuse,	who	kindly	sent	me	his	excellent	dissertation	and	made	detailed	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	I	presented	a	subsequent	version	of	this	article	at	the	Institut	Jean	Nicod	(November	9,	2016).	Many	thanks	to	Jöelle	Proust,	Paul	Egré,	and	their	students	for	their	objections	and	remarks.	A	nearly	final	version	of	this	article	was	also	discussed	at	Susanna	Schellenberg’s	research	seminar	at	Rutgers	University.	I	am	grateful	to	Susanna	and	her	students	for	their	suggestions	of	improvement.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	the	Swiss	Center	for	Affective	Sciences	(NCCR)	and	Thumos:	The	Genevan	Research	Group	on	Emotions,	Values,	and	Norms	at	the	University	of	Geneva	for	providing	an	ideal	research	environment	while	I	was	preparing	this	manuscript.	Work	on	this	project	was	funded	by	a	generous	grant	from	the	Swiss	National	Science	Foundation	(FNS	100012_150265/1).	
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